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We use symbolic dynamics to study discrete adaptive games, such as the minority game and the
El Farol Bar problem. We show that no such game can have deterministic chaos. We put upper
bounds on the statistical complexity and period of these games; the former is at most linear in the
number agents and the size of their memories. We extend our results to cases where the players
have infinite-duration memory (they are still non-chaotic) and to cases where there is “noise” in the
play (leaving the complexity unchanged or even reduced). We conclude with a mechanism that can
reconcile our findings with the phenomenology, and reflections on the merits of simple models of
mutual adaptation.
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I. DISCRETE ADAPTIVE GAMES
A. Introduction
In the last few years, physicists have become very inter-
ested in discrete games. In these models, a finite number
of players or agents pick from a finite set of actions (pos-
sibly varying from agent to agent), at discrete times, and
receive rewards that depend on their own and the other
agents’ actions. Each agent chooses according to a rule
called its strategy; if agents have more than one strategy
available, they use a meta-strategy to chose among them.
As described, the setting fits classical game theory
[1, 2], with its assumption of so-called substantive ra-
tionality — the agents have rational, accurate expecta-
tions, enjoy common knowledge of the structure of the
game, and act so as to maximize their reward. Casual
observation suggests this is not a good model of human
behavior, and indeed experimental psychology [3] and ex-
perimental economics [4] both reject it decisively. Fail-
ing substantive rationality, one turns to some form of
bounded rationality [5] — agents still pursue goals, but
are limited by finite knowledge and finite cognitive ca-
pacities, and so cannot, in general, maximize anything.
Bounded rationality is the subject of a rich literature
in the social sciences, which encompasses both abstract
models [6], some of which exploit familiar methods of
statistical physics [7], and a rapidly-growing experimen-
tal literature, which includes its own array of models
[8, 9, 10, 11]. While the econophysical literature almost
exclusively considers boundedly-rational agents, it never
builds upon other work on bounded rationality. For in-
stance, one of the best-supported meta-strategies is that
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of satisficing, in which an agent searches over its options
and takes the first one it finds with a satisfactory reward
[12, 13, 14]. We are unable to find a single paper which
employs this notion. Econophysical strategies are all, so
far as we know, of the following form. Each agent remem-
bers a simple summary statistic (e.g., the best action to
have taken) for each of the last m turns of the game. For
each such history, a strategy specifies an action to take.
Rather than maximizing, or even satisficing, they employ
adaptive meta-strategies tending to select strategies that
did well in the recent past.
These caricatures or toy models have been studied
since the 1980s, because, it is said, they (1) shed light on
real learning and mutual adaptation, and (2) show sur-
prisingly complex behavior. In this paper, we examine
two forms this complexity is held to take — determinis-
tic chaos, which is a sort of dynamical complexity, and
formally measured complexity, specifically the amount of
information embedded in the system. The rest of this sec-
tion describes the most popular discrete adaptive games,
the minority game and the El Farol Bar problem. The
next section introduces the tools from symbolic dynam-
ics, particularly subshifts of finite type, which we will
use to pry open the mechanisms of these games. We
show that the games are non-chaotic, and put linear up-
per bounds on their complexities. We discuss how to
extend our results to games with either memories of un-
limited length, or noisy play. We then consider what you
must do to a game to make it chaotic, if you want it to
be chaotic. In closing, we suggest a way to reconcile our
findings with common observations on these games.
B. Examples: El Farol and the Minority Game
The best-loved game in econophysics is the
minority game of Challet and Zhang [15], the
subject of a rapidly growing literature (see
2http://www.unifr.ch/econophysics/minority/).
There are N agents, each of which can make only one of
two moves: play “0” or play “1”. If most agents play 0,
then those who play 1 win, and vice-versa. (N is always
odd.) Each player remembers whether 0 or 1 won on
each of the last m turns. Strategies, again, are rules
mapping histories to actions; each agent has s of them.
In effect, strategies must predict what most players will
do, and then do the opposite. Agents keep track of how
many times each of their strategies would have won, and
use the strategy with the best record over the time it can
remember. (Note that psychologists have studied human
performance in just such discrete prediction situations
since the 1950s, without finding anything resembling this
learning mechanism [16].) Ties between strategies are
broken randomly or pseudo-randomly, say by assigning
strategies a random order at the beginning of the game.
Traditionally, the minority game has been studied ei-
ther using the brute empiricism of simulations, or with
statistical-mechanical methods, particularly those em-
ploying the thermodynamic limit. Recently, Jefferies,
Johnson et al. have introduced methods owing more to
dynamical systems, e.g., de Bruijn graphs over possible
sequences of winning outcomes [17, 18]. Our approach
here is related to theirs, but is even more deterministic,
and more microscopic.
The minority game descends from W. B. Arthur’s El
Farol Bar Problem [19]. There are 100 people in Santa
Fe who go out to bars; El Farol is the only good bar.
Normally, those who go there are better off than those
who stay home and watch the stars. But El Farol is
small, and if more than 40 people go, crowding makes
the bar-goers worse off than stay-at-at-homes. Everyone
knows how many people went to the bar on each of the
last m nights. Strategies, again, map histories to actions
— staying home or going to the bar.
Rather than statistical mechanics, the traditional ap-
proaches to the El Farol problem are those of evolu-
tionary adaptation and inductive behavior. Many have
sought to show that either the population of agents co-
evolves a set of mutually-tolerable strategies, or that a
ceaseless evolutionary arms race forces everyone to “run
as fast as they can just to stay in place” [2, 19].
II. SYMBOLIC DYNAMICS, SHIFTS
Symbolic dynamics is one of the basic analytical meth-
ods of nonlinear dynamics and complex systems, and as
such its elements are discussed in standard introductory
textbooks on those subjects (e.g., Refs. [20, 21, 22, 23, 24,
25]). Strangely, however, it does not seem to have been
applied to discrete adaptive games before. We there-
fore give a few words of motivation, before presenting
some basic notions and results. Readers whose curiosi-
ties are aroused will find Refs. [24] and [25] particularly
nice introductions, emphasizing uses in nonlinear dynam-
ics and complexity, respectively. Refs. [26] and [27] more
advanced treatments.
A. Why Symbolic Dynamics?
The essence of symbolic dynamics is substituting
strings of discrete characters or symbols for trajectories
in an original continuous state space. Motion in the orig-
inal space corresponds simply to shifting along the string.
This idea goes back to work by Morse and others in the
1930s. One of its first great successes came in a paper by
Smale [28] which introduced his famous “horseshoe”, and
established the geometry of what we now call chaotic dy-
namics. Smale first constructed a differentiable, invert-
ible map f on a two-dimensional manifold M , which,
while it has a very simple functional form, has almost im-
possibly complicated geometric behavior. He then con-
nected it to the full binary shift map σ on infinite se-
quences of 0s and 1s — that is, the map which simply
substitutes the symbol at position i + 1 for that at po-
sition i. The dynamics of σ are very easy to grasp. In
particular, it is easy to see that it has a countable infinity
of periodic points of arbitrarily high period, an uncount-
able infinity of non-periodic points, and a dense orbit.
(Recall that rational numbers, which are countable, have
repeating binary representations, while irrational num-
bers, which are uncountable, never repeat.) The great
trick, then, was to show that the horseshoe map f and
the shift map σ were topologically conjugate. That is,
he found a continuous function φ from a subset of the
manifold M to the sequence space Σ which was one-to-
one and onto, and which commuted with the two maps.
(Symbolically, φ ◦ f = σ ◦ φ.) This meant that the dy-
namical properties of the horseshoe map could be read
off directly from those of the shift map.
The attraction of symbolic dynamics should now be
clear: we can, so to speak, factor the dynamics of interest
into a clean, simple shift map (σ), and a messier, but
less material, conjugacy map (φ). If, for instance, we
could show that the shift map and the minority game
are topological conjugate, or discern the mechanisms that
prevent them from being conjugated, the dynamics of the
minority game itself would be much more plain to us.
B. Basic Notions
We now will quote the relevant standard results with-
out proofs, which may be found in e.g. Ref. [26]. Begin
with a finite or countable alphabet X of symbols. From
these we make strings or words over X , which are sym-
bol sequences, x0x1x2 . . . xn. Our shift space is a set of
semi-infinite words, x = x0x1x2 . . . xi . . . (i.e. we will be
concerned with sequences on only one side of the deci-
mal point). The dynamics are given by a shift operator
T : Tx = x1x2 . . .. That is, (Tx)i = xi+1. The orbit of a
point is its set of future iterates,
{
x, Tx, T 2x, . . .
}
.
3It is useful, and perhaps comforting, to invoke linear
operators at this point. Let A be a square 0-1 matrix,
with as many rows asX has symbols. Define a shift space
XA where x is allowed iff ∀i, A(xi)(xi+1) = 1. Then XA
is a subshift of finite type and the matrix A corresponds
to the shift operator T . We can also represent XA with
a directed graph GA, where there is one node for each
symbol, and an edge from i to j iff Aij = 1. Then x ∈ XA
iff it is a path through GA. The transition matrix is one-
many if there are symbols i, j, k such that Aij = 1 and
Aik = 1 but j 6= k. A is many-one if there are i, j, k such
that Aik = 1 and Ajk = 1 but i 6= j. And A is one-one
if it is neither many-one nor one-many.
We now have a space XA of sequences, and some of the
properties of this space will be useful later on. First, the
standard metric between two sequences (points) x and y
in the shift space is
d(x, y) =
∞∑
i=0
1− δ(xi, yi)
2i
, (1)
where δ(a, b) is the Kronecker delta. Thus if xi = yi
for all i ≤ M , then d(x, y) ≤ 2−M . Conversely, if
d(x, y) < 2−M+1, then xi = yi for all i ≤M . From this it
follows that the sequence space, equipped with the stan-
dard metric, is compact, totally disconnected and perfect
(i.e., it is closed, and every point is a limit point).
C. Entropies and Lyapunov Exponents
It is now useful to deal with notions defining growth
rates of a given space and spreading rates along orbits.
This will be achieved via standard entropies and Lya-
punov exponents borrowed from ergodic theory. In gen-
eral, not all words are allowed, i.e., not every semi-infinite
word is in the shift space. Likewise, many of the se-
quences are never seen due to the particulars of the shift
operator. If W (L) is the number of allowed words of
length L, the topological entropy is
h = lim
L→∞
1
L
logW (L) . (2)
That is, h is the asymptotic exponential rate of growth
in the number of allowed words. It measures the degree
of exponential spreading in the dynamics. Normally, of
course, that is measured by the Lyapunov exponents. As-
suming those can be defined, the largest Lyapunov expo-
nent λ1 ≤ h. (For specific conditions under which the
Lyapunov exponents exist, see Refs. [29, 30, 31].)
The topological entropy gives equal weight to every
possible word, no matter how improbable. If we wish
to give more weight to the more probable strings, it is
natural to start with the entropy over words of length L,
H(L) ≡
〈
− logPr(xL1 )
〉
(3)
where 〈〉 denotes expectation. This is the mean amount of
information, in bits, required to specify a word of length
L generated by the dynamics. We then define the metric
entropy rate or Kolmogorov-Sinai entropy as
hµ ≡ lim
L→∞
H [L]
L
. (4)
In addition to being an important invariant of the dynam-
ical system, the metric entropy rate can be thought of as
the rate of information production — the rate at which
new information is produced by the dynamics. Clearly,
h ≥ hµ [32]. Under certain conditions on f [30, 33, 34],
hµ is equal to the sum of the positive Lyapunov expo-
nents; more generally it is a lower bound on their sum.
Thus, a positive hµ guarantees the existence of at least
one positive Lyapunov exponent. The proofs of these as-
sertions are somewhat complicated results from ergodic
theory, well-summarized in Ref. [32].
D. Chaos
We adopt the standard topological definition of chaos,
due to Devaney [35]. A compact set Λ, invariant under
T , is chaotic if T is topological transitive on Λ, and its
periodic orbits are dense in Λ. Topological transitivity
means that the trajectory of any open set in Λ eventu-
ally visits every other open set in Λ — we can get from
one part of the region to any other. Together with the re-
quirement of dense periodic orbits, this implies sensitive
dependence on initial conditions. One can imagine the
chaotic trajectories wandering between (but never on)
the dense periodic orbits. Note that the periodic orbits,
while dense, are not stable or attracting [36]. In fact,
sensitive dependence on initial conditions, which we have
just established, in turn implies exponential separation of
nearby orbits, at least under fairly weak conditions, and
hence a positive Lyapunov exponent and positive entropy
rates. These, accordingly, constitute the numerical or ex-
perimental signatures of chaos.
For subshifts of finite type, all of this can be related
to the matrix A (or the corresponding graph) very di-
rectly. XA is transitive if it has dense orbits. (N.B.,
not necessarily dense periodic orbits.) XA is irreducible
if for every pair of indices i and j, there is some l > 0
for which {Al}ij > 0. (This is the same as GA being
strongly connected.) Now, if XA is irreducible, then ei-
ther it is transitive or it consists of a single periodic orbit.
Likewise, if XA is transitive, then A is irreducible.
III. THE MINORITY GAME AS A SHIFT MAP
To do one iteration of the minority game, we need to
know two things. (1) The history of the last m rounds
— which action won on each of them. (2) The “gains” of
all the strategies possessed by the agents — the number
of times each strategy predicted the winning action in
the last m rounds. These facts fix the action of each
agent, and so the winner of the round. That is, the next
4state of the game is a deterministic function of its present
state. (In what follows, “state” will always mean the
global state of the game, never the state of an individual
agent.)
Since each state variable takes only finitely many val-
ues, we can map the state as a whole into a finite alpha-
bet. We order the states and their alphabetic symbols
however we like. Then we build a square matrix A, where
Aij = 1 if j follows i, and = 0 otherwise. XA defines a
subshift of finite type over states of the minority game,
and every run of the minority game is an allowed orbit
of this subshift. We could write down A in some detail,
but shan’t.
Suppose memory for gains extends back indefinitely.
Then the state comes from a countably infinite alphabet,
rather than a finite one, but the subshift is still deter-
ministic (many-one).
In the finite-memory case, the lack of chaos is elemen-
tary once we realize that there are only finitely many
states; the full apparatus of symbolic dynamics is over-
kill. There are only finitely many symbols, so every string
will eventually repeat a symbol. But each symbol has a
unique successor, so after the first repetition, the string
just repeats a single word. Hence every orbit is eventually
periodic.
The topological entropy rate is zero. The first symbol
of a string fixes all subsequent ones, so ∀L, W (L) =
W (1), and h = 0 by Eq. 2.
IV. COMPLEXITY IN THE MINORITY GAME
Before we can say quantitative things about the com-
plexity of a model, we must pick a complexity measure,
of which there are many [25]. When people have dis-
cussed the complexity of discrete games at all, they have
picked the Kolmogorov complexity or “algorithmic infor-
mation content” [37]. Kolmogorov introduced this con-
cept as part of a definition of “randomness” relying on
purely combinatorial notions, part of a long-standing pro-
gram of research in the foundations of probability [38].
The Kolmogorov complexity K(w) of a finite string w is
the length of the shortest computer program which will
produce that string as its output and then stop[66]. Be-
cause any string can be produced by a program like print
‘‘w’’, the complexity of any string cannot be more than
its length plus a constant (the length of the “print” in-
struction). On the other hand, some strings can be pro-
duced by programs which are much shorter than them-
selves, e.g., a string of a million 0s can be produced by
iterating the command print ‘‘0’’ a million times. A
random strings, roughly speaking, is one which cannot be
generated by any program significantly shorter than the
string itself. More exactly, if xL1 are the first L symbols of
an infinite word, and K(xL1 )/n→ 1, then all the proper-
ties which are true of a sequence of independent, identi-
cally distributed random variables are true of the symbols
in the infinite word. For deep reasons connected with the
existence of uncomputable numbers, there can be no gen-
eral procedure for computing the Kolmogorov complexity
of arbitrary strings, nor are there any known procedures
which give well-controlled approximations [37, 39]. How-
ever, if the symbols are generated by an ergodic process,
there is an easy expression for the expected rate of growth
in the complexity [40]:
〈
K(xL1 )
〉
/L → hµ as L → ∞.
This is another illustration of the fact that hµ measures
the rate of information production.
While, as we have said, there is no real way to com-
pute the Kolmogorov complexity, several papers in the
physics literature have attempted to calculate it for
games [41, 42, 43] and even for real markets [44, 45],
with the claim [45] that the high complexity they obtain
shows that financial time series contain much valuable
information. Pace these authors, had they actually been
able to calculate the algorithmic information content, a
high value of it would indicate that the systems they con-
sidered were basically random, because this is just what
Kolmogorov complexity means.
Assuming one wants a notion of “complex” which is
not the same as “random”, what should a good complex-
ity measure be like? As mentioned, many measures have
been proposed [25], but there is some consensus about
what features a good measure should have. It should be
low for both highly ordered and highly random systems;
it should be calculable; and it should have a clear dynam-
ical meaning, rather than just being a number for its own
sake [46]. To our knowledge, only one measure satisfies
all these criteria, the statistical complexity of Crutchfield
and Young [47], a fully formalized and operational version
of Grassberger’s [48] conjectural “true measure complex-
ity”. It is the amount of information about the past of
the system needed for maximally accurate prediction of
its future [49].
We get the statistical complexity by finding the causal
states of the system: each causal state is a distinct dis-
tribution for future events, conditional on the past of the
system. Abstractly, we find the conditional distribution
Pr(x∞1 |x
0
−∞) for each past x
0
−∞, and group pasts with
the same distribution into states. The probability of a
state is then the sum of the probabilities of all the pasts
assigned to it, and the distribution conditional on the
state is just the same as the distribution conditional on
the individual pasts. (In practice, we use a number of re-
cursive tricks to approximate the causal states from finite
data, while only looking at the conditional distribution
of the next symbol [50].) The statistical complexity Cµ
is simply the entropy (uncertainty in bits) of the causal
states = −
∑
i pi log2 pi, where pi is the probability of the
ith causal state. This is maximized when all causal states
are equally probable. In the case of a periodic process,
each phase is a causal state, and each state is equally
probable, so Cµ = log2 P .[67]
We have just seen that the minority game has only
periodic orbits, so to get Cµ, we just need the period.
Start with just one strategy per agent. After the system
has seen every possible history, it must repeat itself, so
5P ≤ 2m. Now give each agent several strategies. The
number of ways agents can deploy strategies is S ≤ sN .
When we’ve gone through every possible history, the
agents could be using different strategies than before.
But once we’ve seen all deployments of strategies, we
must be back where we started. Thus P ≤ S2m ≤ sN2m.
Even these bad estimates give us
Cµ ≤ m+N log2 s (5)
The complexity grows linearly with memory and popula-
tion at most. We get this growth rate only with complete
(combinatorial) independence — an agent’s strategy se-
lection is constrained neither by the selections of other
agents, nor even by the global history!
In a number of recent papers, Savit, Parunak and col-
laborators [51, 52, 53] have considered a complexity mea-
sure closely related to the statistical complexity (they do
not give it a name). In essence, following [54], they treat
two pasts as belong to the same state if and only if they
they lead to the same unique next symbol, whereas statis-
tical complexity requires only that they lead to the same
distribution of future symbols. The two complexities co-
incide for periodic processes. In the presence of noise,
however, the method of Savit et al. will be forced to rely
on longer and longer histories, until it finds ones that
look deterministic simply because of undersampling, and
their complexity will diverge logarithmically in the size of
their data set [55]. The statistical complexity, however,
is well-behaved in the presence of noise (see Section VI
below).
V. INFINITE MEMORY FOR GAINS
People sometimes play the minority game with an in-
finite memory for gains — agents remember the number
of times each strategy has won since the beginning of the
game, rather than just in the last m turns. Then the
alphabet is countably infinite. But what matters are the
difference in strategies’ gains, and if those are bounded,
the finite-state arguments take over. Even when differ-
ences in gains are unbounded, the shift map is many-one,
so there is just a single 1 in each row of the transition
matrix T .
The topological entropy rate of a countable-state shift
is [26, Observation 7.2.10]
h = lim sup
n→∞
1
n
∑
j
(T n)ij , (6)
independent of i. From many-oneness, the sum in Eq. 6
is always exactly 1, so h = 0.
Let us consider also the question of exponential spread-
ing.
The distance between points in the standard metric
is at most 2. d(x, y) = 2 iff xi 6= yi for all i. In that
case, d(T nx, T ny) = 2 for all n, so maximally-separated
points stay maximally separated. On the other hand, if
the distance between x and y is less than 2, then at some
position, k, xk = yk. By the many-oneness of the shift,
if j > k, xj = yj. Therefore, the distance between the
iterates of x and y shrinks until it hits 0. Distance never
increases; spreading of any sort, never mind exponential
spreading, is impossible.
The distance between any two distinct periodic points
is always maximal; that is, given two periodic points x
and y, if x 6= y, then xi 6= yi for all i. To see this, consider
first the case of two points on the same periodic cycle,
of period P . For some 0 < L < P , TL(x) = y. Suppose
that, for some k, xk = yk. Then T
kx = T ky = T k+Lx, so
T kx is periodic with period L < P , which is absurd. Now
consider points on two distinct periodic cycles. Suppose
there were a k such that xk = yk. Then T
k(x) = T k(y).
Hence there is a point, T k(x), belonging both to the x
cycle and the y cycle. But this is absurd, because the
cycles are distinct.
Suppose periodic points were dense. Then for any
point x and any distance ǫ > 0, there would be a pe-
riodic point y 6= x such that d(x, y) ≤ ǫ. But if x is itself
periodic, then we have just seen that d(x, y) = 2 no mat-
ter what periodic point y we chose. Therefore periodic
points are not dense. Chaotic maps have dense periodic
points, so this shift map isn’t one.
VI. NOISE
Traditionally, the minority game is played somewhat
noisily — either players chose strategies with some de-
gree of randomness, or the move they make, once they
have chosen a strategy, is somewhat random. This makes
the game amenable to statistical-mechanical treatment,
a point which has been thoroughly explored elsewhere.
Here, we will see that it can make the entropy rate posi-
tive, but does not increase the complexity.
The usual types of noise imposed in discrete games
change them from deterministic maps into Markov
chains. This means we can represent the state of the
game at one time as a function of the state at the previ-
ous time, and a sequence of stationary, independent noise
variables, i.e., xt+1 = f(xt, ηt), where {ηt} are IID ran-
dom variables which are also independent of the xt. The
Markov property of the sequence {xt} also means that its
entropy rate (metric or topological) is just the entropy of
xt+1 conditional on xt [26, 39]. That is, hµ = H [xt+1|xt],
and similarly for h. Now, applying some basic results of
information theory [39, ch. 2],
H [xt+1|xt] = H [f(xt, ηt)|xt]
≤ H [xt, ηt|xt]
= H [ηt|xt] = H [ηt]
Or, in words: because the only source of randomness
is the noise, the entropy rate of the states must be no
more than the entropy of the noise. A parallel argument
holds for the topological entropy. Nothing in the process
amplifies the noise.
6Now let us consider the statistical complexity. Recall
that a causal state is a distinct distribution of the sys-
tem’s future behavior, conditional on its past. For noise
of the sort described, the present state of the game de-
termines the distribution of future symbols, independent
of any other feature of the past of the system. So the
present symbol fixes the causal state. The noise could
make some causal states more likely than others (reduc-
ing the complexity), or could even lead to two symbols
having the same distribution over future orbits, merg-
ing them into a single causal state (again lowering the
complexity). Adding noise simplifies matters, if it does
anything at all.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We analyzed the global behavior of discrete adaptive
games, using symbolic dynamics. These games are not
chaotic, and the most popular ones are actually of low
complexity, at most linear in the number of agents.
The crucial obstacles to chaos were that the state of the
minority game can be summarized in a discrete alphabet,
and that the evolution of those states is many-one. Our
results will apply, mutatis mutandis, to any determinis-
tic adaptive game of which this is true, for instance, the
El Farol problem, and various discrete market models.
To repeat, this is not an artifact of discretizing contin-
uous models, but a feature of deliberately discrete ones.
Nothing depends on the meta-strategy; our results hold
with learning, imitation, evolution, etc., so long one im-
plements them non-anticipatively.
A. Exponential Spreading versus Exponential
Transients
Anyone who looks at a simulation of the minority game
sees an intricate, hard-to-predict process — we certainly
do. Scientists trained in nonlinear dynamics naturally
look to exponential divergence of orbits to explain these
observations. We have seen that there is no such diver-
gence in the standard, noiseless version of these games;
there are three ways to get it.
• Hidden information. If only some agents have ac-
cess to a (changing) outside source of information,
then there can be apparent transitivity in the game,
and so deterministic chaos. A neat example is the
Brock-Hommes asset-trading model [56, 57, 58],
where agents get simple adaptive strategies for free,
but must pay for rational expectations of future
prices.
• Add noise. As we’ve seen (Sec. VI), this certainly
allows exponential divergence, but in a trivial way,
and at a cost in complexity.
• Coupling to chaos. Break ties using a chaotic shift
map, or something similar. Often this will make
the game chaotic.
Only the first of these mechanisms has any economic rel-
evance. In real markets, information is expensive, but
transparency is prohibitively expensive, and so hidden
information is ubiquitous. Exploring the consequences
of this is an important problem of great economic in-
terest; indeed, the problem is common across almost all
social situations. The other methods, by contrast, are
“unphysical,” lacking in substantive content. Of course,
hidden information cannot explain the phenomenology of
games in which it is absent, but it is no less interesting
on that account.
What however does account for that phenomenology?
We suggest that the answer is exponentially fast diver-
gence, but rather exponentially slow convergence. For
the minority game, it is numerically well established that
relaxation times grow exponentially with m [59]. What
is less appreciated is that, in high-dimensional dynami-
cal systems, the approach to the attractor can be so slow
that it is never reached in simulations, at least not within
the lifespan of ordinary experimenters (but see [60]). In
systems formed by coupling smaller dynamical systems,
such as the agents in our games, the duration of the tran-
sient epoch often grows exponentially with the number
of agents [61]. The attractors and their invariant dis-
tributions are irrelevant; what matters is the structure
of the attractor basin [62] and the quasi-stationary tran-
sient distribution it produces [63]. Once recognized, these
long transients are actually a feature of discrete adap-
tive games, since the social systems they are supposed
to model are essentially never in an invariant state, but
always “in transition”[68]. The transients are, however,
bad news for methods based on either ergodic or thermo-
dynamic limits. Quantities like the entropy rate and the
Lyapunov exponents, which are rigorously defined only
in the limit, loose much of their interest.
B. Directions for Future Work
The motive for studying models like the minority game
should not be that they are complex systems in some for-
mal sense. In any area of modeling, formal constructs ac-
quire interest from their ability to help resolve problems
of physical relevance — that is, here, social relevance. We
have argued that such constructs as algorithmic complex-
ities and stationary and thermodynamic limits have not
demonstrated such relevance here, and are unlikely to do
so in the future. By contrast, the distinctively transient
dynamics of such systems, especially their basin struc-
ture, hold great promise for understanding the origins
of complex behavior we see in these games. The hope
of econophysics is that these models portray, in stylized
miniature, key aspects of real mutual adaptation and so-
cial interaction, and that studying the portrait will help
us understand the original. This is not an outlandish
7hope, since profound insights have come from study-
ing the equally-stylized Prisoners’ Dilemma [64], and a
host of other, less famous models [2, 5, 65] have illumi-
nated the collective life of political, boundedly-rational
animals. We hope that the discrete adaptive games of
econophysics will take their place in this set. The contri-
bution of econophysics, it seems to us, be to assimilate
the rich body of empirical findings and models of indi-
vidual choice and learning, and say something distinc-
tive and illuminating about how large numbers of such
boundedly-rational agents interact.
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